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Thinking about the
Conservative Thinkers
A Book Review by E. Donald Elliott
ook out, EPA! Just when you
thought you'd survived the
conservative onslaught, here comes
Fred L. Smith, Jr., and friends.
The environmental policies of
Bush-Quayle/Reilly-Habicht have
emphasized reforming EPA's programs
to incorporate market incentives,
risk-based priorities, cost-effectiveness,
and voluntary cooperation from
industry to prevent pollution.
According to the Smiths of the world,
these reforms are mere halfway
measures. They amount to "the
ecological equivalent of ... market
socialism," the failed policy of former
Communist countries in which goals
were set politically but implemented
through markets. They may even be
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dangerous, because they "make it
[regulation] easier" (horror of horrors),
not to mention cheaper and more
efficient.
The real target, argues Smith and a
growing segment of the conservative
intelligentsia, should be the entire
concept of centralized regulation of the
environment by the government. Not
only is centralized, bureaucratic
regulation inherently subject to
self-serving manipulation by "special
interest groups," including
environmental groups and bureaucrats,
but, more fundamentally, the concept
of centralized regulation protecting the
environment is wrong.
Environmental Politics: Public Costs,
Private Rewards, edited by Michael S.
Greve and Fred L. Smith, Jr. (Praeger,
1992; 209 pp.), consists of nine
chapters. Seven are case studies by
authors of particular environmental
decisions, from the Clean Fuels
Program (under the 1990 Clean Air
Act), to Superfund, and the
controversy over the use of the
synthetic hormone bovine
somatotropin to increase milk
production in dairy cows. The
common theme is "rents," the
argument popularized by University of
Chicago economists that government
regulation provides a ready political
lever that special interests can use for
their own purposes. This is not a new
idea, but the case studies are
interesting and useful in that they
illustrate how the process works in
environmental regulation.
The intellectual core of the book,
however, is in the introductory and
concluding essays by editors Greve
and Smith. Greve summarizes the
arguments about what is wrong with
the present system. Curiously absent
from his summary is the criticism that
regulation does too little, that the
present system requires huge volumes
of information and, therefore, is slow
and cumbersome, and leaves some
problems unaddressed. In the final
chapter, Smith develops his
provocative theoretical argument that
private remedies should replace the
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present system of government
regulation.
Market Failure Re-Examined
For decades, the standard theoretical
justification for public environmental
regulation has been the concept of
"market failure": Unregulated markets
fail to internalize the true social costs
of pollution because polluters can
"externalize" the costs of their
pollution onto others as damages that
go uncompensated. Thus, government
should step in to regulate.
This "market failure" argument is
useful as far as it goes; however, a
number of academics have criticized it
for failing to consider the moral-if not
outright religious-dimension that
underlies our attitudes about the
environment; among other things, the
conventional economic argument for
reglating pollution implies that not
having enough pollution is bad
(because the money spent could
produce greater benefit elsewhere), an
idea that many find strange.
Smith attacks the market failure
justification for public regulation from
a totally different perspective. The best
way to protect the environment,
perhaps the only way, he says, is not
through government regulation, but
through expanding private markets to
include environmental quality: "Rather
than viewing the world in terms of
market failure, we should view the
problem of externalities as a failure to
permit markets and create markets
where they do not yet--or no
longer--exist." This has some force in
areas such as municipal solid waste,
where government monopoly on trash
collection hides the true costs of waste
disposal from consumers.
Private Environmental Law
In emphasizing private alternatives to
government regulation of the
environment, Smith is part of a
growing chorus of free-market thinkers,
as illustrated by the recent books of
Richard Stroup and John Barden, and
Terry Anderson and Donald Leal.
While this literature is long on
criticism of the present system and on
theoretical arguments for "private
environmental law," it is very short on
the practical details of how private
property and litigation rights would
actually replace public regulation in
protecting the environment.
The standard view, which Smith
discounts, holds that private nuisance
or damage suits by individuals harmed
by pollution, while useful in some
cases, cannot be relied on to regulate
pollution because of the problem of
"transaction costs": The costs of
developing information about the harm
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caused by pollution are too large, and
the provable damages that could be
recovered by individuals are too small
to make it worthwhile for many
lawsuits to be brought, particularly
since case-by-case litigation is very
expensive and time-consuming.
Smith acknowledges that these
problems are "real" but argues that
moving the issue into the public sector
doesn't make the problems less
difficult: "Under a private regime,
proof problems and the like will
sometimes cause a failure to abate
pollution. The political manager, in
contrast, can limit pollution even
without proof of damage."
Smith's arguments are interesting
and provocative, but a bit Utopian. I
doubt that "private environmental
law" will ever replace government
regulation. History never repeats itself
exactly, and the 19th century's
approach to regulating pollution is
unlikely to be reinstated. A more likely
future is a "hybrid" system, in which
both private rights and governmental
regulation work together.
Elements of public/private hybrid
systems already exist: for example, in
Superfund, which consists of a strange
amalgam of government regulation and
private litigation; and in the Toxic
Release Inventory, in which
government regulation requires the
compilation and disclosure of
information, but private, local action
then "enforces" pollution prevention
based on this information. The record
of such systems is mixed, but the high
costs and long delays in the Superfund
program do not inspire confidence that
case-by-case litigation in the courts is a
cure-all for the problems of public
environmental law.
Most conservative thinkers complain
bitterly about private lawsuits as a
regulatory device where they currently
exist-product liability, medical
malpractice, toxic torts. It is a strange
anomaly that they have such faith in
private lawsuits to take on the much
larger, and more difficult task of
environmental regulation. 0
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